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CONTRACTUAL SHIFTING OF DEFENSE COSTS IN
PRIVATE OFFERING SECURITIES LITIGATION
HENRY KLEHM IIIt
It is a folly to expect men to do all that they may reasonably
be expected to do.
-R. Whately*
Federal securities regulation exists primarily to reduce fraud in
the sale of securities through disclosure of all material facts in a man-
ner least disruptive to capital formation.' This purpose is implemented
through the disclosure,2 registration,' and antifraud" provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933,1 the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,8 and
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"). To enforce the 1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress
and the judiciary have created express" and implied' civil causes of ac-
tion to penalize those who sell securities with materially false or mis-
leading statements or omissions.
Congress, however, also recognized that varying degrees of investor
knowledge existed" and that the costs to issuers of compliance with the
t B.S.B.A. 1980, Villanova University; J.D. Candidate 1988, University of
Pennsylvania.
* R. Whately, APOPHTHEGMS 219 (1856).
See President's Message to the Senate Concerning Regulation of Securities Is-
sues, 77 CONG. REc. 937 (1933) [hereinafter President's Message]; H.R. REP. No. 85,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1933); Preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat.
74; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 38 (6th ed. 1987); L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 35-38 (1983) [hereinafter L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS]; I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 123 (2d ed. 1961); Gadsby,
Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The Government View, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 6, 9 (1959).
' Securities Act of 1933 §§ 6-8, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-h, j (1982) [hereinafter
1933 Act].
I See 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982); see also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
supra note 1, at 39-40.
" See 1933 Act §§ 11-12, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1, q (1982); Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
5 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
6 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
See 1933 Act §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1 (1982).
8 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1Ob-5 (1987) [hereinafter Rule 1Ob-5], see also infra notes 112-20 and accompa-
nying text.
" See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1933); Landis, The Legislative
History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 37-38 (1959); see
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registration provisions of the securities laws were high.'0 Consequently,
it carefully drafted a scheme of exemptions from the registration re-
quirements. Through the private offering exemption, section 4(1) of the
1933 Act," and the civil liability provisions of section 12 of the 1933
Act,' 2 Congress achieved a balance between the rights of knowledgeable
purchasers and those of private offering issuers.'"
The SEC, in response to the exhortations of Congress and securi-
ties law commentators,' 4 developed Regulation D as a "safe harbor"
for issuers claiming an exemption from registration.' 5 Under Regula-
tion D, the issuer obtains certain representations from the potential
purchaser, or "offeree," to fulfill the requirements of the safe harbor.
An issuer shields itself from potentially strict liability, imposed by sec-
tion 12(1) of the 1933 Act,' 6 by obtaining warranties from the offeree
covering her "suitability" for the offering and representations that she
has read and understands the disclosure with which she was provided.
To reduce the costs of potential section 12(1) actions instituted by pur-
chasers, the issuer enters into an indemnity agreement with each pur-
chaser to protect itself from the costs of defending a lawsuit that fails to
establish a securities law violation.'" The indemnity agreement is
designed to hold the private offering investor to her representations. It
also notifies the investor of the potential for a breach of warranty coun-
terclaim should she initiate a fraud action and then expressly repudiate
her warranties.
This Comment argues that the development of the private offering
exemption and the statutory structure of the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws permit an issuer to enforce such an indemnifica-
tion agreement in limited circumstances. The indemnification may be
structured to provide reimbursement by contract for the costs of defend-
ing a fraud action that fails to establish a violation of securities law by
also infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text (varying degrees of sophistication among
investors is the basis for exempting certain securities).
10 See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 337-40; see also W. PRIFTI,
SECURITIES: PUBI.IC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS § 4:02 (rev. ed. 1983) ("A private of-
fering under the federal rules can be handled . . . with less expense" than a public
offering.).
1 1933 Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1982).
12 1933 Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
13 See Landis, supra note 9, at 37-38.
14 See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
" Regulation D is the common name for a series of rules promulgated by the
SEC in 1982 and is designed to provide a uniform private offering exemption. 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1987); see also Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %I 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 100-02.
17 See Zissu v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 805 F.2d 75, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1986).
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the defendants. The enforcement of such contracts, moreover, furthers
the public policies behind the private offering exemption and the an-
tifraud provisions.
Part I of this Comment details the development of the private of-
fering exemption and the sliding scale liability provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts. Part II analyzes the attorneys' fee shifting provisions of
federal securities law"8 and the problems faced by a private offering
issuer in a modern strike suit when a court applies a "bad
faith-frivolous claim" standard to determine if a plaintiff should pay
the fees of the issuer's attorneys. 9 Part III then argues that a properly
drafted indemnification provision should be enforced in limited circum-
stances to further the design and policies of federal securities law.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND SCHEME OF THE PRIVATE OFFERING
EXEMPTION AND THE ANTIFRAUD STATUTES
Although calls for federal regulation of corporations date back to
1885,2" regulation by individual states of corporate securities, in the
guise of "blue sky" laws "with teeth," first appeared as early as 1911.21
Comprehensive attempts to regulate the issuance and sale of securities
by the federal government were not successfully enacted until after the
Great Crash of 1929, amidst the ensuing Great Depression.22 In the
tradition of blue sky regulation,2 3 the first proposals for federal regula-
18 See 1933 Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982); 1934 Act §§ 9(e), 18(a), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), r(a) (1982).
11 See Zissu, 805 F.2d at 80 (plaintiff's failure to support his claims, contradictory
testimony, jury findings of credibility, and plaintiff's concededly sophisticated back-
ground support finding of frivolous claim, meritless suit, and bad faith conduct of liti-
gation); Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18,
22 (9th Cir. 1981) (undertaking need not be based on formal finding that claim or
defense is obviously without merit or asserted in bad faith; only required that court, in
view of evidence before it, reaches "an eventual finding" of bad faith or lack of merit);
Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 831 (2d Cir. 1976) (record on appeal must
support fee award when securities law claims were frivolous or brought in bad faith);
LeMaster v. Bull, 581 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (fees only available when
court finds claim or defense was "without merit" and court must make "specific finding
that the suit or the defense was meritless or otherwise frivolous"); Straus v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729, 732-34 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (award of attorneys' fees
may be based on either finding of bad faith in commencement of action or determina-
tion that plaintiff's claim "borders on frivolous").
20 See UTILrrY CORPORATIONS, S. Doc. No. 92, pt. 69-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1934); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 31.
21 L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 8 (Kansas was the first state to
pass such laws.); see also Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. TIMES 37 (1916)
(describing and sharply criticizing American blue sky laws).
11 See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 29; Landis, supra note 9, at
30.
23 "[Tjhe term 'blue sky law' first came into general use to describe legislation
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tion evolved around determinations of the true "merit" of the securities
offered to the investing public.2 4 However, the underlying rationale of
the regulatory proposal which led to the 1933 Act was based on an
alternative philosophy: comprehensive disclosure.25
President Franklin Roosevelt articulated his view of the full dis-
closure rationale in his Message to Congress accompanying what was
to become the Securities Act of 1933:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should
not take any action which might be construed as approving
or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the
sense that their value will be maintained or that the proper-
ties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that
every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate com-
merce shall be accompanied by full publicity and informa-
tion, and that no essentially important element attending the
issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
This proposal . . . puts the burden of telling the whole
truth on the seller ....
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the
public with the least possible interference to honest
business.26
This overriding policy articulated by President Roosevelt is em-
bodied in the two principal objectives of the 1933 Act. The first is "to
protect investors by requiring adequate and accurate disclosure regard-
aimed at promoters who 'would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple.'" L.
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 8 (footnote omitted).
24 Such legislation was proposed initially by Huston Thompson, a former member
of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). See Landis, supra note 9, at 30-31.
Thompson's proposal called for the FTC to "revoke the registration of any security
... if upon examination ... it shall appear. . . that its affairs are in unsound condi-
tion ... or that the enterprise or business of the issuer . . . is not based upon sound
principles, and that the revocation is in the interest of the public welfare." H.R. 4314,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1933). Merit regulation proposals were criticized sharply.
See, e.g., Landis, supra note 9, at 30-33; id. at 32-33 ("[Tlhe Thompson bill ...
provided no basis for sound federal securities legislation."). For a discussion concerning
how the "merit" of a security permeated state blue sky regulation, see generally Tyler,
More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 899 (1982). For an overview and
discussion of recent developments concerning state merit blue sky laws, see Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Committee,
Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 785 (1986).
25 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933); L. Loss, FUNDAMEN-
TALS, supra note 1, at 35; 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 1, at 121-
29.
28 President's Message, supra note 1, at 937.
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ing securities distributed to the public .... ,,17 This objective is
achieved primarily through the registration provisions of section 5,28
which require that new issues of securities be registered with the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission" and be accompanied by a disclosure
document if sold in interstate commerce. The second objective is "to
outlaw fraud in the sale of all securities whether or not newly is-
sued." 30 This "antifraud" objective is enforced via private civil actions
pursuant to sections 1181 and 12,32 in conjunction with other enforce-
2 Gadsby, supra note 1, at 9.
28 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
9 Although the 1933 Act was originally administered by the FTC, the SEC was
created by the 1934 Act to regulate the sale of securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
not the securities themselves. See 1934 Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982 & Supp. III
1985); see also Gadsby, supra note 1, at 9-11 (discussing the role of the SEC).
10 Gadsby, supra note 1, at 9; see Preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38,
48 Stat. 74.
s 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982), provides:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (un-
less it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such un-
truth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, sue -
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar
functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of
the registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration
statement as being or about to become a director, person performing simi-
lar functions, or partner;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose
profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his
consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the regis-
tration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valua-
tion which is used in connection with the registration statement, with re-
spect to the statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation,
which purports to have been prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
32 1933 Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982), provides:
Any person who -
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of this
title, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the
provisions of section 77c of this title, other than paragraph°(2) of
subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means or instru-
ments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omis-
1988]
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ment provisions. These sections are supplemented by section 14, which
invalidates "any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision"3
3 of
federal securities laws. As discussed below, these antifraud provisions
are further supplemented by sections 10(b) and 17(a) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934"' and subsequent judicial interpretation.
3 5
A. The Private Offering Exemption
The registration and disclosure provisions of the 1933 Act were
designed to provide adequate truthful disclosure to prevent issuers from
misleading the investor. 6 Specifically, disclosure was designed to "place
the owners of securities on a parity, so far as is possible, with the man-
agement of the corporations, and to place the buyer on the same plane
so far as available information is concerned, with the seller."'37 At the
same time the drafters were cognizant of the impediments that the reg-
istration provisions placed on "honest business."
The sale of an issue of securities to insurance companies or
to a limited group of experienced investors, was certainly not
a matter of concern to the federal government. That bureau-
cracy, untrained in these matters as it was, could hardly
sion), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may
sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less
the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such secur-
ity, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
33 1933 Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
34 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982); id. § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 789 (1982).
Section 10 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
3 See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
S6 See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION, supra note 1, at 128 & n.21 ("Con-
gress did not take away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a fool of him-
self.' It simply attempted to prevent others from making a fool of him.").
177 CONG. REC. H2918 (1933) (statement of Rep. Rayburn).
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equal these investors for sophistication, provided only it was
their money that they were spending. 8
In recognition of the "parity" which may exist between some buy-
ers and sellers of certain types of securities, sections 3 and 439 created
exemptions for certain issues and transactions. Over the past fifty years,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to its statutory au-
thority,40 has developed rules and regulations delineating "safe
harbors" for exemption under these sections.4
Among the statutory exemptions included in section 4 are "trans-
actions by an issuer not involving any public offering." '42 Although the
legislative history addressing this provision provides little guidance,4 it
does shed some light on the general direction the drafters believed this
exemption should take.44 The exemption included "an issuer [making]
a specific or an isolated sale of its securities to a particular person" '45
and such transactions in which "there is no practical need for [the
Act's] application or where the public benefits are too remote." 46
Transactions, however, were not to be exempted "unless [purchasers
11 Landis, supra note 9, at 37.
39 1933 Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982), exempts certain classes of securities,
such as government, bank, or insurance company issues, from the registration require-
ments of § 5, while 1933 Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1982), exempts certain
transactions.
40 1933 Act, § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982), provides:
The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations,
and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add
any class of securities to the securities exempted as provided in this sec-
tion, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such
securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of
investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character
of public offering; but no issue of securities shall be exempted under this
subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to
the public exceeds $5,000,000.
41 Such exemptions include Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1987),
which regulates new issues of private offerings, and Regulation A, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144 (1987), which exempts certain transactions in the secondary market. This
Comment focuses solely on transactions by issuers in new issues.
Although the SEC has authority to promulgate rules exempting certain issues of
$5 million or less under 1933 Act § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982), it has created
Rule 506 as part of Regulation D. This rule exempts offerings without regard as to the
dollar amount of the offering. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text. But see L.
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 375 (Professor Loss questions the SEC's au-
thority to adopt Rule 506.).
42 1933 Act § 4(2), U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). Section 4(2) was embodied originally
in § 4(1) of the 1933 Act and became § 4(2) in 1964. See Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
41 See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 349.
44 See id.
41 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933).
48 Id. at 5.
1988]
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are] so small in number that the sale to them does not constitute a
public offering."
'47
Until 1962, interpretation of the private offering exemption was
based on a 1935 opinion of the SEC's General Counsel.48 The opinion
focused primarily on the factors to be considered in determining the
availability of the exemption. 49 The SEC, alluding to a previous discus-
sion of the Office of the General Counsel, stated that an offering to
twenty-five or fewer persons does not involve a public offering and,
hence, is an exempted transaction.5" The release also highlighted other
factors such as 1) the relationship of offerees to each other and the
issuer; 2) the number of units offered; 3) the size of the offering in
dollar terms; and 4) the manner of the offering.51
The SEC release implied that members of certain classes of offer-
ees, whose membership "may be determined by the application of some
pre-existing standard," would not constitute members of the general
public, and thus did not require the full protections theoretically af-
forded by the disclosure and registration requirements.52 These classes
consist primarily of investors with special knowledge of the issuer, such
as "insiders," and those with "economic bargaining power."5 Subse-
quent statutory and administrative pronouncements concerning the pri-
vate offering exemption continue to follow this classification scheme.
The Supreme Court, however, suggested that the private offering
exemption was based on criteria other than the number of offerees. In
1953, the Court held in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.54 that the availa-
bility of the exemption depended upon the extent to which the offerees
needed the protections of the Act. In Ralston Purina, an employer dis-
tributed its unissued common stock through a private offering to select
employees who were willing to "take the initiative and [were] interested
' ABA Position Paper, Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAw. 485, 486
(1975) [hereinafter ABA Position Paper] (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5-7, 15-16 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-29 (1933)).
48 See Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to Be Considered in De-
termining the Availability of the Exemption from Registration Provided by the Second
Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No. 33-285 (Jan. 24, 1935) (available on
Westlaw) [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 33-285]; ABA Position Paper, supra
note 47, at 486-87 (describing the "interpretative stage" set by Securities Act Release
No. 33-285, supra).




11 See id. ("[An offering to the members of a class who have special knowledge of
the issuer is less likely to be a public offering than is an offering to the members of a
class of the same size who do not have this advantage.").
.4 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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in buying stock at present market prices. '  The company willingly
conceded that a similar offering to all its employees would have consti-
tuted a public offering but contended that because the employees al-
lowed to purchase the stock were chosen at management's discretion,
the offering was private.5" In holding that "corporate employees, as a
class," could not be deprived of the protections of the registration and
disclosure provisions through such an offering, 57 the Court stated:
[T]he exemption question turns on the knowledge of the of-
ferees . . . .The focus of inquiry should be on the need of
the offerees for the protections afforded by registration. The
employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of
information which registration would disclose. The obvious
opportunities for pressure and imposition make it advisable
that they be entitled to compliance with section 5.58
Despite Ralston Purina, subsequent SEC interpretations of the
exemption continued to emphasize the relevance of "counting noses."5 9
Judicial decisions subsequent to Ralston Purina frequently denied the
exemption and found the registration provisions violated, often in egre-
gious cases.60 In the face of conflicting and confusing interpretations by
5 Id. at 121.
5 See id. at 121-22.
67 Id. at 125.
58 Id. at 126-27.
11 See, e.g., Great N. Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 266, 268 (1970).
60 See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., Inc. 463 F.2d 137, 160-61 (5th Cir.
1972) (letters from investors asserting knowledge of the investment held insufficient to
justify exemption without proof that all offerees had contact with Continental officers
and access to any additional information); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 691 (5th Cir. 1971) (no exemption allowed because of-
ferees received inaccurate and insufficient information); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d
631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971) (evidence of private offering cannot be based on conclusory
statements); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 679 (4th Cir.)
(none of the purchasers possessed required knowledge that would have been available
in a registration statement), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967). But see, e.g., Gilbert v.
Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 358 (10th Cir. 1970) (allowing private offering exemption because
seller not required to state every fact which might influence a purchaser's decision);
Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963) (small number of offerees, small
size of transactions, small number of units sold, and the knowledge of the offerees held
sufficient to establish a private offering); Woodward v. Wrights, 266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th
Cir. 1959) (arrangement made between close friends and acquaintances on a personal
basis constituted a private offering); Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp.
1104, 1112 (D. Mass. 1974) (although offerees did not sign investment letters or possess
all information required by registration, surrounding circumstances, such as close rela-
tionships and business expertise of offerees, provided sufficient basis for allowing the
private offering exemption); Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609, 624
(D. Del. 1971) (access to relevant data, rather than all that a registration statement
would have revealed, constitutes basis for private offering if the transaction involves
offerees with business expertise; however, this result did not follow as a matter of law
1988]
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the SEC and the judiciary, soon-to-be SEC Chairman Garrett espoused
his view that the combined body of law concerning the private offering
exemption was a "kind of mishmash . . .[where tihe saving recipe is
kept secret, a moving target which [the issuer] can never be sure he has
hit."'6' Furthermore, some commentators thought the exemption was
destroyed by two Fifth Circuit cases.6 2
In the face of the uncertainties surrounding the private offering
exemption, the SEC proposed a safe harbor in Rule 146.63 The Rule
specified conditions that, if observed, would ensure that a particular
transaction would qualify for a section 4(2) exemption.64
but depended on factual analysis); Vicioso v. Watson, 325 F. Supp. 1071, 1078 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (transaction constituted a private offering because only two investors were
involved and deal was made through direct negotiations); Fuller v. Dilbert, 244 F.
Supp. 196, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (no public offering found because investors were few in
number, sophisticated businessmen, and had access to all information which registration
would disclose), aff'd, 358 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1966); Value Line Fund v. Marcus, [1964-
1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,523, at 94,970 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 1965) (few offerees with sophisticated knowledge and access to relevant information
clearly make the transaction a private offering); Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F.
Supp. 104, 112 (D. Minn. 1958) (no public offering found because investors could protect
themselves, and transactions involved were few and distinct from each other); Campbell
v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975, 977 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (no public offering existed because
of the small number of investors and their close relationship to each other).
61 PRA IICING LAW INSTITUTE, FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 10-11 (1973).
82 See 2 S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SECURITIES
§ 2.16(a) (Release No. 14, Nov. 1982); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 1, at
307; L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 371; Kripke, Wrap-up, 29 Bus. LAW.
185, 187 (Special Issue, Mar. 1974). The two cases were Continental Tobacco, 463
F.2d at 161 (issuers failed to establish that offerees had a "privileged" relationship with
Continental Tobacco), and Henderson v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir.
1972) (defendants failed to meet burden of proof to establish a private offering because
they presented no evidence of the number of offerees, the relationships between ofiterees
and issuer, the offerees' knowledge of each other, or the manner of the offering). Some
commentators believed that these cases narrowed the exemption by requiring "insider"
status of the offerees. See, e.g., Marsh, Who Killed the Private Offering Exemption?,
71 Nw. U.L. REV. 470, 476 (1977) (Continental Tobacco has been "read by some as
indicating . . . that only 'insiders' were eligible as buyers pursuant to the private offer-
ing exemption.") The Fifth Circuit, however, later gave a different interpretation. See
Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 908 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[Wle do
not read Continental as requiring insider status ...[because] [sluch requirements
would constrict the scope of the private offering exemption more narrowly than does
Rule 146 . . . ."). The most alarming issue for issuers was the strict liability imposed
by § 12(l) for § 5 violations when the issuer failed to hit the "moving target." See
infra text accompanying notes 100-02.
8 Notice of Revision of Proposed Rule 146 Under the Securities Act, Securities
Act Release No. 5430, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,529
(Oct. 10, 1973).
64 Id.; see also PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 357 (1974) [hereinafter FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE] (Rule 146
sets forth conditions necessary to qualify for a § 4(2) exemption.).
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While the courts heralded Rule 146 as a "serotine development," 5
practitioners 6 and academics"' greeted it with criticism. The Rule
proved problematic because it was essentially a codification of the
vagueness of preexisting law. 8 It created the possibility that a minor
infraction of one "condition," such as the failure to file a form, could
render an issuer strictly liable under section 12(1) for rescission of an
entire offering, regardless of the significance of the violation. In addi-
tion, implementation of the Rule became difficult and costly almost
immediately."9
By 1978, the prophecies of the early critics of the rule had become
reality. Indeed, SEC Chairman Harold Williams himself recognized
the shortcomings of Rule 146. He acknowledged that modifications to
Rule 146 were necessary to "benefit . . .small businesses seeking to
raise capital. Compliance with the rule was . . . unduly complex,
costly, and subjective, with an unacceptable level of risk that the ex-
emption may be lost inadvertently.
' 7 0
Moreover, the procedures required by judicial interpretation 1 of
Rule 146 were only economical for issuers raising large amounts of
capital. While the SEC7' and Congress73 took steps in other areas to
85 Doran, 545 F.2d at 908.
6 See FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 385-93; Practicing Law In-
stitute, Letters of Comment on Proposed Rule 146: Securities Act Release No. 5430,
in RuLE 146 219-329 (1974).
17 See, e.g., Benton & Gunderson, Venture Capital Financings and Exemptions
from Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933: Section 4(2), Rule 146, and Rule
242, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 23, 44 (1981) (issuers rarely depend on Rule 146 in
venture capital transactions); Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933: Practical Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE L.J.
1139, 1143-47 (ambiguities of the Rule devastate small issuers); Kessler, Private Place-
ment Rules 146 and 240-Safe Harbor?, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 37, 38 (1975)
(vagueness of rule can increase dangers for small issuers); Kinderman, The Private
Offering Exemption: An Examination of Its Availability Under and Outside Rule
146, 30 Bus. LAW. 921, 921 (1976) (imprecise standards and unclear obligations of
Rule 146 lead to practical problems; additionally, compliance with the Rule's require-
ments is unduly burdensome for small businesses).
" Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 33-5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974).
89 See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 1, at 319.
70 Hearings on Capital Formation Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Bus-
iness, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 584 (1978) (statement of Harold Williams, Chair-
man, SEC).
7' The Fifth Circuit in Mary S. Krech Trust v. Lakes Apartments, 642 F.2d 98,
103 (5th Cir. 1981), held that the seller's use of offeree questionnaires, project fact
sheets, and a list of all brokers and offerees was sufficient evidence of a private offering
exemption. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 1, at 319 (such "due diligence"
procedures important to fulfill burden of proof that conditions of Rule have been met).
7'2 The SEC's power to exempt small offerings, under § 3(b) of the 1933 Act, was
increased to $5 million in 1980. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-477, tit. 3, § 301, 94 Stat. 2275, 2291 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
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aid small businesses in raising capital apart from the section 4(2) ex-
emption, the use of that exemption more frequently occurred in real
estate and oil and gas syndications."'
In response to these problems, the SEC adopted Regulation D" in
1982. It provides a comprehensive safe harbor to remove "dispropor-
tionate restraints on small issuers" and to develop a uniform exemption
from registration "in order to facilitate capital formation consistent
with the protection of investors."71 6 The three exemptions provided by
Regulation D are found in Rules 504, 505, and 506.77 Rules 504 and
505 provide exemptions under section 3(b) based on aggregate offering
pricey.7  Rule 504 is designed primarily for small issuers engaged in
intrastate offerings.7  Rule 505 offerings are limited to $5 million and
sales may be made to accredited investors and up to thirty-five "pur-
chasers that are not accredited investors."80 Rule 506 provides an ex-
emption for offerings without regard to aggregate offering price pursu-
§ 77c(b) (1982)).
7' See Omnibus Small Business Capital Formation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
477, tit. 5, § 505, 94 Stat. 2291, 2292-93 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77s(c)(1) (1982)), which added subsection 19(c) to the 1933 Act. Subsection 19(c)
authorized the SEC to coordinate federal securities matters with state securities associa-
tions, primarily the North American Securities Administrators Association
("NASAA"). See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 1, at 328.
71 See Business and Corporations Law Section, Los Angeles County Bar Associa-
tion, Recent Developments in Corporate and Securities Laws, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
79, 120-21 (1980) (comments of Neal Brockmeyer, member, Executive Committee,
Business and Corporations Law Section, Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n). For a com-
parison of the relative cost of private, Regulation A, and intrastate offerings, see W.
PRIFTI, supra note 10, at §§ 1:11-:12.
" 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1987). On January 16, 1987, the SEC published
for comment proposed amendments to several of the rules comprising Regulation D.
"The revisions involve additions to the 'accredited investor' definition in the regulation,
an increase in the ceiling on the total offering price permitted under Rule 504 for
certain offerings, and the revision of the general solicitation restrictions under Rule
504." Regulation D Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 6683, [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,054, at 88,399 (Jan. 16, 1987) [hereinafter
Proposed Revisions].
78 Regulation D-Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration Under the
Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities
Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,106, at 84,908 (Mar. 8, 1982) [hereinafter Revised Exemptions Under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933].
77 Id. at 84,907-09.
78 See id. at 84,918.
79 See id. at 84,909 ("The [SEC] is proposing to expand the availability of Rule
504 as a capital-raising device."). See Proposed Revisions, supra note 75, at 88,402.
Under the proposed revisions, "the aggregate offering price that could be offered under
Rule 504 would be raised to $1 million . . . ." Id.
8 See Revised Exemptions Under the Securities Act of 1933, supra note 76, at
84,909.
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ant to section 4(2).1 Rule 506 is limited to thirty-five "sophisticated"
purchasers, and, as in Rule 505, "[alccredited investors . . .do not
count towards that limit."
8 2
The provisions of Rule 506 are consistent with legislative history
and subsequent judicial and administrative interpretations of the section
4(2) exemption. The criteria for accredited investor status embody the
economic bargaining power or specialized knowledge standards of pre-
vious interpretations. Exemptions are provided for those investors with
"knowledge," such as institutions or executive officers, 3 and those with
economic bargaining power, such as high-income or high-net worth in-
dividuals. 4 In addition, Rule 506 requires that "unaccredited" pur-
81 See id.
82 Id.
83 Rule 501(a)(1)-(4) provides:
As used in Regulation D [§§ 230.501-.506], the following terms shall
have the meaning indicated:
(a) Accredited Investor. "Accredited investor" shall mean any person
who comes within any of the following categories, or who the issuer rea-
sonably believes comes within any of the following categories, at the time
of the sale of the securities to that person:
(1) Any bank as defined in section 3(a)(2) of the Act whether acting
in its individual or fiduciary capacity; insurance company as defined in
section 2(13) of the Act; investment company registered under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 or a business development company as defined
in section 2(a)(48) of that Act; Small Business Investment Company li-
censed by the U.S. Small Business Administration under section 301 (c) or
(d) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958; employee benefit plan
within the meaning of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974, if the investment decision is made by a plan fiduciary, as
defined in section 3(21) of such Act, which is either a bank, insurance
company, or registered investment adviser, or if the employee benefit plan
has total assets in excess of $5,000,000;
(2) Any private business development company as defined in section
202(a)(22) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940;
(3) Any organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code with total assets in excess of $5,000,000;
(4) Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of
the securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or
general partner of a general partner of that issuer ..
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(4) (1987).
The proposed revisions to Regulation D would "extend the definition of accredited
investor to include various institutional investors, such [as] savings and loan associations
and broker-dealers, certain trusts, partnerships and corporations, and to permit a joint
as well as an individual income test .... " See Proposed Revisions, supra note 75, at
88,400 (footnote omitted).
84 Rule 501(a)(5)-(8) classifies the following as accredited investors:
(5) Any person who purchases at least $150,000 of the securities be-
ing offered, where the purchaser's total purchase price does not exceed 20
percent of the purchaser's net worth at the time of sale, or joint net worth
with that person's spouse, for one or any combination of the following: (i)
Cash, (ii) securities for which market quotations are readily available, (iii)
19881
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chasers be sophisticated, i.e., that they have "knowledge and experi-
ence" to assess the risks and merits of the offering 5 without regard to
the purchaser's ability to withstand the economic risk of the offering.86
These terms of Regulation D represent a combined legislative, ju-
dicial, and administrative acknowledgment that certain investors do not
need the protections afforded by the registration requirements when
they have the requisite knowledge, economic or bargaining, power, or
expertise to protect themselves.
B. The Fraud Liability Provisions
In response to the President's Message 7 and to the "tragedy in the
lives of thousands of individuals who invested their life savings" 8 in
$25 billion of worthless securities, 9 Congress included in the 1933 Act
provisions to remove the common law obstacles to fraud recovery and to
penalize the sellers of fraudulent securities."0 These provisions included
express civil remedies for defrauded purchasers of securities,9 a general
antifraud provision for SEC enforcement,92 and criminal sanctions for
an unconditional obligation to pay cash or securities for which market
quotations are readily available which obligation is to be discharged
within five years of the sale of the securities to the purchaser, or (iv) the
cancellation of any indebtedness owed by the issuer to the purchaser;
(6) Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net
worth with that person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds
$1,000,000;
(7) Any natural person who had an individual income in excess of
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years and who reasonably expects
an income in excess of $200,000 in the current year; and
(8) Any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited inves-
tors under paragraphs (a) (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), or (7) of this section.
17 C.F.R. § 501(a)(5)-(8) (1987).
88 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1987). Rule 506 modifies the purchaser
qualification principles of its predecessor, Rule 146, in two ways. First, whereas Rule
146 drew no distinction between "accredited investors" and "unaccredited purchasers,"
see 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)(1) (1982), "Rule 506 requires that only [unaccredited]
purchasers meet the sophistication standard." Revised Exemptions Under the Securities
Act of 1933, supra note 76, at 84,919. Second, Rule 506 gives no consideration to the
purchaser's ability to withstand the economic risk of the offering. See id.
86 See Revised Exemptions Under the Securities Act of 1933, supra note 76, at
84,919.
"7 See President's Message, supra note 1.
8 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
8 See id.
SO See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 808-817; 3 L. Loss, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION, supra note 1, 1430-44.
"' 1933 Act § 12 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982)).
82 1933 Act § 17(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982)).
Whether a private cause of action can be implied under section 17 is an open question.
The Supreme Court has reserved the question on several occasions. See Bateman Eich-
ler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 304 n.9 (1985); Herman & MacLean
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willful violations of the Act,"3 as well as other sections delineating vari-
ous procedural limitations. 4
1. The Express Remedies of the 1933 Act
Section 11 provides for civil liability on the part of the issuer and
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.2 (1983); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 n.9 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 733 n.6 (1975). The circuits currently are split over this issue. Compare
Mosher v. Kane, 784 F.2d 1385, 1390-91 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing an im-
plied right of action under § 17(a)) and Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652
F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that "a private right of action exists under
§ 17(a)") and Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978)) (holding
that § 17 is "broad enough to imply a private right of action"), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
909 (1979) and Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that
"§ 17(a) supports a private damage claim") with In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys.
Sec. Litig., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,330, at 96,669
(9th Cir. July 30, 1987) (en banc) (finding "no indication, explicit or implicit, of legis-
lative intent to create a private right of action under section 17(a)") and Corwin v.
Marney, Orton Invs., 788 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1986) (no private cause of action
exists under § 17 (a)) and Keys v. Wolfe, 709 F.2d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 1983) (refusing
to find error in lower court's ruling that no private right of action existed under
§ 17(a)) and Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 384-91 (5th Cir. 1982)
(rejecting an implied private cause of action under § 17(a)) and Shull v. Dain, Kalman
& Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1977) (restating prior holding that "the
private remedy of a purchaser must be found in § 12(2) and not in § 17(a)"), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) and Anderson v. Lowrey, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,372, at 96,927 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1987) (no recogni-
tion of private cause of action under § 17(a)) and In re Storage Technology Corp. Sec.
Litig., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,716, at 93,480
(E.D. Colo. Mar. 16, 1986) (refusing to imply a private cause of action under § 17(a)).
The grounds cited for not recognizing an implied § 17(a) action are based on a fear
that the creation of a remedy under § 17(a) would undermine the liability scheme of
§§ 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act. See Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 488
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
93 1933 Act § 24 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982)) (Willful viola-
tions are punishable by up to five years of imprisonment or up to a $10 thousand fine,
or both.).
9' 1933 Act § 13 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982)), provides a
statute of limitations of one year from discovery of the false or misleading statements in
actions under §§ 11 or 12(2), and one year after a violation of § 12(1), and in no event
more than three years after sale for actions under § 12(2) or after offered to the public
for actions under §§ 11 or 12(1). See SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th
Cir. 1982); Summer v. Land & Leisure Inc., 664 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1981). But
see In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337, 344-45 (N.D. Okla. 1975)
(fraudulent concealment tolls three-year limitation period). Section 14 voids any stipu-
lations waiving compliance with federal securities laws. 1933 Act § 14, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77n (1982). Section 15 creates liability for a person who controls, through stock own-
ership or otherwise, another person who fails to comply. 1933 Act § 15, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77o (1982). "Control" is the "possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the
ownership of voting securities . . . or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1987). Fi-
nally, § 16 makes the remedial provisions of the 1933 Act nonexclusive. 1933 Act § 16,
15 U.S.C. § 77p (1982).
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various other classes of persons such as directors, experts, and under-
writers. Liability is incurred when the registration statement or any
part thereof contains "an untrue statement of a material fact or [omis-
sion of] a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading. '95 Section 11, however,
does not impose absolute liability on all participants involved in formu-
lating the registration statements;9 indeed, there are some statutory de-
fenses. 7 By its express terms, section 11 covers liability for registration
statements and, therefore, is not generally relevant to offerings claiming
an exemption from registration requirements.
Section 12 contains two provisions. Section 12(1)9" imposes liabil-
ity for rescission for violations of the registration requirements in sec-
tion 5. In order to deter noncompliance with the registration require-
ments,99 liability under section 12(1) is "virtually absolute."' 100 If an
issuer misses the target of a section 4(2) exemption and has not com-
plied with the registration requirements under section 12(1), she then
becomes strictly liable for rescission.101 The only defense to a section
" 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C § 77k(a) (1982).
91 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1933). A § 11 plaintiff must
demonstrate first that the securities she bought were issued under the complained of
registration statement. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271-73 (2d Cir. 1967);
Turner v. First Wis. Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 911 (E.D. Wis. 1978). She
also must show that the misstatement or omission was material. See Greenapple v.
Detroit Edison Co., 468 F. Supp. 702, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 618 F.2d 198 (2d
Cir. 1980). But see In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 297 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(plaintiff need not prove privity, reliance, causation, or scienter in § 11 action).
" Underwriters and certain other enumerated classes are provided with a "due
diligence" defense if they can show that they did not know and could not reasonably
have discovered an untrue or misleading material statement or the existence of a mate-
rial omission. 1933 Act § ll(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1982). Furthermore, under-
writers and others are not responsible for material misstatements in "expertised" por-
tions of registration statements. See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643, 682-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Insiders, such as officers and directors, must sat-
isfy a high burden to establish a due diligence defense; alternatively, they may engage
in "whistle blowing" by resigning and notifying the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. See 1933 Act § 11(b)2, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(2) (1982).
9s 1933 Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982).
91 See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 1, at 776; L. Loss, FUNDAMEN-
TALS, supra note 1, at 832-33, 1026; 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note
1, at 1692-98.
100 L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1017.
101 See, e.g., Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir 1986), cert. granted, 107
S. Ct. 1885 (1987); Western Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439, 1442-43 (9th Cir.
1984); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1980); Chapman v. Dunn, 414
F.2d 153, 158-60 (6th Cir. 1969); Anastasi v. American Petroleum, Inc., 579 F. Supp.
273, 274-75 (D. Colo. 1984). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Pinter to
review the scope of the term "seller" under § 12(1) and to determine if the common
law defense of in pari delicto is available in a § 12(1) action. See Federal Securities
Law Reports, No. 1226, pt. 1, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2 (April 22, 1987). The
Supreme Court's decision in Pinter will effect the "absoluteness" of liability under
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12(1) claim is to show that the sale did not violate section 5.102
For private civil plaintiffs, section 12(2) serves as a broad an-
tifraud provision unrelated to the registration requirements.'0 Section
12(2) applies to any sale of a security regardless of exemptions.0 . and,
in addition, covers all false or misleading statements, whether oral or
written. 10 5 Section 12(2) reaches a broad class of sellers by requiring
privity between the seller and the person purchasing such security.' 0 6
Furthermore, if "a purchaser is in privity with the defendant [seller],
but the defendant is not named in section 11 (e.g., a dealer in a selling
group), the purchaser could sue him only under section 12(2).' 1107 Sec-
tion 12(2) places the burden on the plaintiff to prove her lack of knowl-
edge. This contrasts with section 11 under which the burden rests on
the defendant to prove that a plaintiff had knowledge. 0 8 Section 12(2)
also does not contain the defenses to liability, such as "expertising,"
included in section 11. Finally, proof of reliance on the false or mis-
leading statement is unnecessary under section 12(2).'0'
§ 12(1).
102 See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 1, at 833.
103 See id. at 834.
104 See id. at 833. Sales of bank and government securities are exempted from
§ 12(2) liability under 1933 Act § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1982).
105 See id.; Stoppelman v. Owens, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 91,511, at 98,570 (D.D.C. June 7, 1984).
10I See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 1, at 834. The definition of who
may be sued typically includes such terms as sellers, those in privity, substantial factors,
substantial participants, coconspirators, and aiders and abettors. The terminology varies
from circuit to circuit and even within a circuit. See, e.g., Collins v. Signetics Corp.,
605 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1979) (those in privity or with "some special relationship");
Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988, 990 (1st Cir.) (sellers), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705
(1940); Van Boeckel v. Weiss, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 99,648, at 97,589 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1983) (substantial factor); Frankel v. Wyllie
& Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730, 744 (W.D. Va. 1982) (aiders and abettors); In re
Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("some indica" of
participation or solicitation).
107 R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 1, at 834.
108 See id.; see also In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(plaintiffs have burden of proving that they were unaware of untrue statements or
omissions when they purchased the securities).
109 See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 1, at 1278; see also Alton Box
Board Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff need
not prove reliance to recover; instead, must show causal relationship between the mis-
leading representations and the sale); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 830 n.8
(2d Cir. 1976) (when liability is based on a sale, § 12(2) requires a causal relationship
between the challenged communication and the sale, even if not decisive); Gilbert v.
Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 356 (10th Cir. 1970) (purchaser reliance is not a prerequisite to
seller liability under the statute); John Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129
(4th Cir. 1970) (causation did not present a material issue of fact because buyer need
not show that she relied on a misstatement or omission); Brooks v. Land Drilling Co.,
574 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (D. Colo. 1983) (plaintiff need only show causal connection
between the challenged communication and the sale, not reliance).
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In its report accompanying these provisions, the House Committee
stated that "the duty of care to discover [fraud] varies in its demands
upon participants in security distribution with the importance of their
place in the scheme of distribution and with the degree of protection
that the public has a right to expect."'11 Viewed with regard to liability
under sections 11 and 12, this statement illuminates the sliding scale of
liability that those sections create. First, the importance of the partici-
pant/defendant's role conditions the procedural and substantive aspects
of her liability and defenses. Second, "the degree of protection" that the
purchasers may expect suggests a legislative intent to facilitate recovery
for violations of registration requirements and to impede recovery for
purchasers of exempt securities relative to purchasers of registered se-
curities. Taken together, these explanations reflect a legislative judg-
ment that the purchaser of an exempt security should not receive the
same general litigation advantages from the express liability provisions
as those provided to purchasers of registered securities.",
2. Implied Actions Under the 1934 Act
The 1933 Act regulated the issuance of new securities. To remedy
the "purely speculative operations" of the various exchanges, 12 how-
ever, Congress enacted the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act was enacted to supplement the antifraud
provisions of the 1933 Act by creating an enforcement vehicle for the
new Securities and Exchange Commission." 3 Under its broad rulemak-
ing power, the Securities and Exchange Commission hurriedly . 4 added
the present heart of the civil antifraud provisions, Rule 10b-5,115 in
Furthermore, the plaintiff need never have received the information containing the
misleading statement nor even seen a prospectus. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1225-26 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981);
DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 841 (2d Cir. 1968).
110 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d. Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933).
... Cf. Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 596 F. Supp. 797, 801-802
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (investor's sophistication is relevant to adequacy of disclosure).
112 See Message of the President to Congress on the Regulation of Securities Ex-
changes, 78 CONG. REC. S2264 (Feb. 9, 1934).
11. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
114 The circumstances surrounding the SEC's adoption of Rule lOb-5 have been
described aptly by a former SEC staff attorney. See ABA, Conference on Codification
of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967). The total discussion by
the Commissioners about the proposed rule consisted of "'Well, we are against fraud,
aren't we?'" Id. (Milton Freeman, one of the rule's codrafters, quoting Sumner Pike).
11 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
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1941. This Rule originally was added to close "a loophole in the pro-
tections against fraud" and to grant the SEC a vehicle for attacking
fraudulent sellers of securities.116
Unlike sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, neither Rule 10b-5 nor
section 10(b) provides express civil remedies for private purchasers or
sellers of securities.1 1 7 The federal courts, nevertheless, implied a pri-
vate remedy in 1946 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.1 18 In recent
years the Supreme Court has imposed various restrictions on the very
broad potential reach of Rule 10b-5. 19 Currently, "[tihe existence of
this implied [private] remedy simply is beyond peradventure." 2 °
II. THE EMERGENCE AND FAILINGS OF "BAD FAITH" IN
THE PRIVATE OFFERING CONTEXT
Commentators greeted the broad civil liability provisions of sec-
tions 11 and 12 with criticism of the in terrorem effect such sweeping
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
116 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-13 n.32 (1976) (quoting
SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942)).
117 The 1934 Act did create certain express civil liability provisions, none of which
is applicable specifically to a new issue of securities claiming a private offering exemp-
tion. Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides an express civil remedy for a person who
purchases or sells a registered security on a national exchange at a price affected by
unlawful manipulation. 1934 Act § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982). Section 18 grants a
cause of action to a person who purchases or sells a security in reliance on a false or
misleading statement made in a document filed with the SEC. 1934 Act § 18, 15
U.S.C. § 78r (1982). The practical impact of these provisions is limited. See 11A E.
GADSBY & A. SOMMER, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934, pt. 1, § 5.04 (1986).
18 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See generally E. GADSBY & A. SOMMER,
supra note 117, § 5.04 (tracing the development of implied civil remedies under the
federal securities acts).
119 The Supreme Court first recognized an implied private right of action in Su-
perintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). Since then,
the Court has decided numerous other cases highlighting the existence of this implied
right. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (silence is actionable
only with a duty to disclose); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)
(action requires misrepresentation or nondisclosure); TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976) (action requires material omission or misstatement); Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212-14 (action requires allegation and proof of scienter); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.5 (1975) (action requires actual
purchase or sale of a security); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
152-53 (1972) (in an action for omission, reliance is presumed).
110 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
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liability would impose on legitimate securities issuers. 2 ' As part of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Congress enacted the "Fletcher
Amendments" to the 1933 Act.' 2 Aimed specifically at sections 11 and
12, these amendments were intended to "give assurance to every honest
man who is an official of a corporation that he need have no fear of the
Securities Act of 1933 ...."I"
Congress believed that honest corporate officials feared strike
suits2 4 made possible by the civil liability provisions of the 1933 Act.
In order to alleviate these fears,' 25 Congress amended section 11(e)126
to provide, in part:
In any suit under this or any other section of this title the
court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the
payment of the costs of such suit, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and if judgment shall be rendered against a party
litigant, upon the motion of the other party litigant such
costs may be assessed in favor of such party litigant ...if
the court believes the suit or the defense to have been with-
out merit, in an amount sufficient to reimburse him for the
reasonable expenses incurred by him .... 127
Congressional shifting of attorneys' fees found in section 11(e) is
thought to be one of the exceptions to the general "American Rule"
concerning payment of legal fees in litigation.'2
Under the American Rule each party litigant bears his own attor-
neys' fees regardless of the outcome of the litigation. 29 Fees also may
be shifted under the "common benefit" rule which spreads the cost of
litigation among those who are benefited by the action'3" or when liti-
121 See, e.g., Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J.
171, 210-16 (1933).
122 Amendments to Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 907
(1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982)).
122 78 CONG. REC. 10,186 (1934) (statement of Sen. Brynes).
124 See id. at 10,185.
125 See id. at 10,186.
12' Amendments to Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 907
(1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982)).
127 Id. at 908.
128 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
see also Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat.
2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)). For a comprehensive collection of attor-
neys' fee statutes, see Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1985); Alyeska, 421 U.S. at
260-69.
129 See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247.
130 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-67 (1939);
Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-37 (1882).
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gation is commenced or conducted by either party "in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons ....11131
In securities fraud cases involving section 11 (e), courts apply dif-
ferent standards to determine the meaning of "without merit. ' 132 Most
courts, however, have included the concept of "bad faith" in their deci-
sionmaking process.1 33 Further clouding the meaning of "without
merit" is the fact that the courts are split as to the meaning of bad faith
and its applicability to "colorable" claims."3
Although the specific term "bad faith" does appear in the Senate
Committee Report accompanying the Fletcher Amendments, Professor
Loss points out that the imputation of a bad faith requirement to a
meritless claim is dubious."3 5 A better interpretation suggests that Con-
gress really intended to create two separate situations in which fees
could be shifted: strike suits and bad faith litigation. This reading is
further supported by a Conference Committee report accompanying the
amendment to section 11(e) of the 1933 Act:
It provides, as a defense against blackmail suits as well as a
defense against purely contentious litigation on the part of
131 F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974); accord Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,
1088 (2d Cir. 1977).
132 Compare Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980) (award of
attorneys' fees for bad faith only proper when "clear evidence" shows that a claim is
entirely without color and made for reasons of harassment and delay) and Homburger
v. Venture Minerals, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 92,205, at 91,563 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1985) ("without merit" requires showing that
claim does not simply lack merit but also borders on frivolous) and Robert Alan Ins.
Agency v. Girard Bank, No. 83-2370 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file) ("failure of a party to present sufficient evidence at trial . . . does not,
standing alone, support a determination . . . that attorney's fees should be awarded")
with Western Fed. Corp. v. Erikson, 739 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1984) ("without
merit" standard includes claims and defenses that "either are brought in bad faith or
border on the frivolous"); accord Straus v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729, 732-
33 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"I See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1214; see also cases cited
supra note 19 (discussing the application of the "bad faith-frivolous claim" standard).
"" See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1212. Compare DASA Corp.,
560 F.2d at 1088 (award of attorneys' fees not supported by trial court finding that
litigation was conducted in bad faith to force reduction in conversion price of stock
because legal claim was based on "colorable" theory) with In re National Student
Mktg. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 726, 728 (D.D.C. 1978) (litigation motivated by vindictiveness
supports "bad faith" award of attorney's fees despite presentation of colorable legal
claim), affd sub. nom. Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
11 See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1213. "In order to give protec-
tion against 'strike' suits, or litigation brought in bad faith, the court is authorized to
assess reasonable costs, including attorney's fees against either party to the suit ... .
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934). The section of the report from which
this was taken later became § 9(e) of the 1934 Act.
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the defendant, that a court can require a bond for costs and
can assess costs against the plaintiff if his suit had no merit
or against the defendant if his defense had none. The sug-
gested amendments seem equitable.1"6
The modern Supreme Court's interpretation of attorneys' fees pro-
visions in securities fraud cases further supports reading the bad faith
standard out of certain strike suit situations. In Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co.,"37 the Court liberally construed similar fee-shifting provisions
in the securities context. Mills involved the use of a misleading state-
ment in proxy solicitation material, 38 a possible violation of section
14(a) of the 1934 Act.139 After concluding a private right of action did
exist under section 14(a),"40 the Court fashioned a remedy for a con-
summated complex merger that was "fair" on its term."" The Court
concluded that in the absence of an express statutory authorization for
the award of attorneys' fees under section 14(a), the express provisions
in sections 9(e) and 18(a) "should not be read as denying to the courts
the power to award fees in suits under other sections of the Act when
circumstances make such an award appropriate .... ""'
In determining when circumstances were appropriate, the Court
reasoned that the clear remedial provisions of other statutes may fore-
close implying a right to a fee award; however, the broad remedial pur-
poses of the 1934 Act did not prevent courts from granting appropriate
remedies.1 4 Similar to the implied right of action reasoning of J.L Case
Co. v. Borak,14 "[t]he courts must . . . determine whether the special
circumstances exist that would justify an award of attorneys' fees
. . M"45 Justice Black, dissenting from this part of the opinion, indi-
cated that contractual arrangements to shift attorney's fees may be
valid. "I do not agree. . . that stockholders who hire lawyers to prose-
136 H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1934) (emphasis added).
137 396 U.S. 375 (1969).
138 See id. at 377.
131 1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
140 See Mills, 396 U.S. at 381-83.
141 See id. at 386-89.
142 Id. at 390-91.
143 See id. at 391.
144 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ("While [§ 14(a)] . . . makes no specific reference
to a private right of action . . . [, it] certainly implies the availability of judicial relief
where necessary. . . ."); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569
(1978) (limiting J.L Case Co. to statutes that prohibit certain conduct and create fed-
eral rights for private parties).
146 Mills, 396 U.S. at 391. The remainder of the opinion, which held that attor-
neys' fee awards were appropriate for the bestowal of a "common benefit" for private
enforcement of a statutory law, was limited by Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-69 (1975).
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cute their claims in such a case can recover attorneys' fees in the ab-
sence of a valid contractual agreement so providing or an explicit stat-
ute creating such a right of recovery. "146
Mills may well have been the high point for securities laws "im-
plied" actions and remedies. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the
Supreme Court imposed a series of substantive requirements in Rule
lob-5 fraud actions.1 47 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,1 41 the Court
held that plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 actions must allege and prove "scien-
ter," i.e., an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, on the part of
the defendant. 49 As part of its rationale, the Court noted that "the
express civil remedies in the 1933 Act . . . [including] § 11, ...
[were] subject to significant procedural restrictions not applicable under
§ 10(b)."' 0 This would include § 11(e)'s security-for-costs provi-
sion. 5 ' The Court articulated in a footnote that "one of. . .[the] pur-
poses [of section 11(e)] was to deter actions brought solely for their
potential settlement value." '152
In a more recent decision, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,15 3
the Supreme Court interpreted how the remedial provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts should be construed: "[S]ecurities laws combating fraud
should be construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate [their] remedial purposes.' "154 Applying this flexible inter-
pretation to the combined purposes of the registration exemptions, an-
tifraud provisions, and section 11(e) leads to this possible conclusion:
Congress did intend for certain potential plaintiffs-those who were not
to receive the same protections afforded the general public under the
Acts1 55 -to be deterred more from bringing suits for their settlement
value. Such an interpretation also implies a different standard for fee-
shifting under section 11(e).
The concept of "settlement value," moreover, is much different for
the plaintiff involved in a private offering than one involved in a public
offering. Offerings exempted from the registration requirements also
146 Mills, 396 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147 See supra note 119.
148 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
149 Id. at 193.
150 Id. at 208-09.
151 Id. at 209-10.
152 Id. at 211 n.30.
153 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
154 Id. at 386-87 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 195 (1963)); accord Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
155 See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
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are exempted from the margin requirements of the 1934 Act.158 Ex-
empt offerings, therefore, may be purchased with any combination of
cash and installment or demand debt. In the tax shelter area, for exam-
ple, the security is purchased often with a relatively small initial cash
investment and a full recourse loan for the balance of the offering
price.157 By instituting a fraud action under sections 10(b) and 12(2)
for a failed investment,15 8 the investor may be seeking release from her
15' 1934 Act § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982), requires the Federal Reserve
Board to "prescribe rules and regulations with respect to the amount of credit that may
be initially extended and subsequently maintained on any security (other than an ex-
empted security)." The Board's primary regulations in this area are as follows: Regula-
tion G, 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.1-.7 (1987) (governing lending by other persons who engage
in the business of making loans for purchasing or carrying margin securities); Regula-
tion T, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.18 (1987) (governing lending on securities by broker-deal-
ers); Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.1-.8 (1987) (governing loans made by banks for
purchasing or carrying margin stock or that are secured by margin stock); Regulation
X, 12 C.F.R. §§ 224.1-.3 (1987) (governing borrowing by persons in the U.S. from
domestic or foreign lenders for the purpose of purchasing or carrying securities). For a
general discussion of lending on securities by broker-dealers and banks, see REPORT ON
SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 4, at 15-25 (1963).
Under Regulation T, private placements and small business offerings are explicitly
exempted. 12 C.F.R. § 220.12 (1987). In addition, the Federal Reserve Board has
taken the position that offerings made under Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D, 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.505-.506 (1987), are exempt from the operation of Regulation T, supra.
See Interpretative Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 33-6455, 48
Fed. Reg. 10,045, 10,054 (1983). For a detailed discussion of Regulation T, see 4 R.
HAFT & P. FASS, TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS § 2.05[2] (1986).
1"7 See Kashner, Financing Limited Partnerships and Their Partners: Caveat
Creditor, 37 Bus. LAW. 171, 171-72 (1981) (describing the structure of many private
offerings). The Internal Revenue Code effectively requires that an investor be "at risk"
in certain tax shelter investments by allowing the investor to claim losses "only to the
extent of the aggregate amount with respect to which [she] is at risk." I.R.C.
§ 465(a)(1) (1982). The amount she has at risk is comprised essentially of her cash
investment plus recourse debt. See 4 R. HAFT & P. FASS, supra note 156, § 1.05;
Klehm & Ward, Common Elements of Tax Advantaged Investments, J. COM. & FIN.,
Spring 1983, at 43, 44-45.
18 See, e.g., Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986) (allegation of
materially misleading claims); Warner v. Central Trust Co., 715 F.2d 1121, 1122 (6th
Cir. 1983) (fraud in initial transaction); DuPont v. Brady, 646 F. Supp. 1067, 1072
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (materiality of scienter omissions); Hill v. Equitable Bank, N.A., 642
F. Supp 1013, 1016 (D. Del. 1986) (connection to RICO violations); Greenberg v. RRI
XX Management Corp., No. 85-1262 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file) (gross misrepresentation of limited partnership tax shelter); Leslie v.
Minson, No. 84 Civ. 8674 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) (fraud in the transaction solicitations); Westland Energy 1981-1 Ltd. v. Bank of
Commerce & Trust Co., 603 F. Supp. 698, 704 (N.D. Okla. 1984) (direct causality
between knowing material misrepresentation and harm suffered); Cromwell v. Com-
merce & Energy Bank, 464 So. 2d 721, 729 (La. 1985) (applicability to letters of
credit); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments, 311 Minn. 452, 465, 250
N.W.2d 172, 178 (1977) (recognition of honesty in intent defense); Brown v. United
States Nat'l Bank, 220 Neb. 684, 690, 371 N.W.2d 692, 695 (1985) (disclaimers may
limit misrepresentation of bank letters of credit).
[Vol. 136:971
SHIFTING OF DEFENSE COSTS
recourse obligation. One commentator, discussing this type of suit from
the perspective of the lender, summarized the problem as follows:
[T]he lender seeking to collect on . . . investor notes
may face a series of rather formidable hurdles to overcome if
the business of the venture fails . . . . For in those circum-
stances, investors will not be particularly eager . . . to per-
mit realization on the collateral security . . . and may be
expected to invoke any and all possible claims and defenses,
however spurious.15
In these circumstances, defendants are tempted to trade off collec-
tion of the recourse debt against the potential costs of defending a fraud
suit. 60 Thus, the private offering investor may receive value in a suit
without merit. It is these types of actions which typify "modern" strike
159 Kashner, supra note 157, at 172. Among the claims a participant in a failed
private offering may expect are security fraud claims. See id. at 189-201. Lenders in
private offerings frequently require investors to post letters of credit as collateral for
loans in private offerings. Such lenders can expect investors to seek injunctions against
collecting on investor letters of credit should the lender be forced to call upon the letter.
See, e.g., Warner, 715 F.2d at 1122-23 (plaintiff sought to enjoin letter of credit he
provided as part of purchase price of investment in limited partnership on grounds of
fraud). For a discussion of the law surrounding such injunctions, see Farrar, Judicial
Intervention, in LETTERS OF CREDIT AND BANKERS' ACCEPTANCES 1986, at 651, 657
(Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 399, C. Mooney & R.
Ryan eds. 1986); Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J.
596 (1978).
0 The cost of defending securities fraud suits is significant in relation to the
amount of the investor's initial investment. For example, defense costs in Zissu v. Bear,
Stearns & Co., 627 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 805 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1986), dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 162-73, were claimed to be $555,000 for the
issuer and the underwriter, while Zissu's investment totalled only $1.5 million. See
Zissu, 627 F. Supp. at 689, 690-91. Defendants also often face the prospect of litigating
investor claims in different jurisdictions at the same time. Cf. Kashner, supra note 157,
at 172 (lenders seeking to collect on investor notes face task of collecting from a number
of individuals who may reside in different jurisdictions).
The possibility of liability under RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982), in the
context of securities fraud may increase the temptation for abuse. See Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). RICO
provides a number of advantages to the securities plaintiff including treble damages,
attorneys' fees, a broad scope of discovery, broad venue choices, and an opportunity to
avoid the substantive restrictions of securities laws by bringing a RICO claim based on
mail or wire fraud rather than a § 12(2) or a § 10(b) claim. In fact, "RICO claims
are now being routinely added to complaints based on alleged securities law violations
.... " Kleinberg & Morris, An Introduction to Civil RICO for Securities Law Liti-
gators, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION 243, 247 (Litigation
and Administration Practice Series No. 276, B. Vanyo & E. Yodowitz eds. 1984).
At least one court granted judgment for the plaintiff on a recourse obligation owed
to him by a defendant despite the court's conclusion that securities laws were not vio-
lated by the defendants. See Eriksson v. Galvin, 484 F. Supp. 1108, 1129 & n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (describing judgment based on long-overdue note as "merely a pyrrhic
victory").
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suits.
III. THE USE OF INDEMNIFICATION CONTRACTS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO ESTABLISHING BAD FAITH
The modern strike suit in the private offering context subverts the
purposes of securities laws to provide "sliding scale" antifraud remedies
and to aid the capital formation goals embodied in the private offering
exemption. Additionally, the imputed "bad faith-frivolous claim" stan-
dard of section 11(e) does not achieve its deterrent purposes when the
private offering investor has an expected settlement value lower than
the defendants' costs of first establishing compliance with the securities
law and thereafter prevailing on a bad faith claim. Under these circum-
stances the issuer who qualifies for the private offering exemption may
protect himself via a contractual agreement such as Justice Black sug-
gested in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 1' In certain limited circum-
stances, the contract would not violate federal securities laws; moreover,
the contract actually can be structured to further the purposes of the
disclosure requirements in the private offering context.
The case of Zissu v. Bear, Stearns & Co.' is illustrative of the
modern strike suit and a contractual agreement which, with some modi-
fication, should survive judicial scrutiny. The plaintiff, Frederick Zissu,
purchased $1.5 million of a private offering oil and gas limited partner-
ship as a tax shelter." 3 Zissu, as related by the District Court, signed a
document with the following provision in the course of purchasing:
I understand the meaning and legal consequences of the rep-
resentations and warranties contained . . . [herein] and I
agree to indemnify and hold harmless the Partnership and
each general and limited partner thereof from and against
any and all loss, damage or liability due to or arising out of
a breach of any representation or warranty of mine, whether
contained in the Partnership Agreement or this Subscription
Agreement. Notwithstanding any of the representations,
warranties, acknowledgments or agreements made herein by
me, I do not thereby or in any other manner waive any
rights granted to me under federal or state securities laws.
64
396 U.S. 375, 397 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
162 627 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 805 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1986).
163 See Zissu, 805 F.2d at 76.
164 Zissu, 627 F. Supp. at 691.
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In conformity with Rule 146 requirements,16 5 the plaintiff had
represented that he was a wealthy, sophisticated investor and that he
not only had read and understood the investment literature but also was
able to bear the financial risks of the offering.1 66 When the venture
proved "less successful . . . than [Zissu] had . . . hoped,"' 67 he insti-
tuted a fraud action under sections 10(b) and 12(2). The defendants""
counterclaimed based on the above provision and the plaintiff's breach
of his express warranties.' 6 9 At trial the jury found no violations of
securities laws and granted the defendants' breach of warranty counter-
claim. 7 0 On appeal the Second Circuit upheld the award of fees based
on bad faith but avoided determining the validity of the counterclaim,
finding the drafting of the indemnity clause "not sufficiently specific"
to hold Zissu liable for the costs of defending the suit.' Had the dam-
age provision been more specific, the contractual counterclaim would
not violate federal securities laws or their underlying policies.
Two provisions, section 14 of the 1933 Act 2 and section 29 of the
1934 Act, 7 13 delineate when a contract or stipulation is void under fed-
eral securities law. A brief review of the judicial interpretations of these
provisions indicates that the Zissu indemnity clause was not void under
these statutes. First, section 14 (and its counterpart in section 29(a) of
the 1934 Act) void "any condition, stipulation or provision binding any
person acquiring security to waive compliance with [federal securities
laws].' 74 The Supreme Court appeared to construe the purposes of
165 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974).
166 See Zissu, 805 F.2d at 76-77.
167 Zissu, 627 F. Supp. at 694.
168 The defendants in Zissu were the issuer, a limited partnership, and the seller,
Bear Stearns. Bear Stearns was also a "special limited partner" and, therefore, in-
cluded in the indemnification agreement. See 805 F.2d at 76.
166 See id. at 77. It is important to note that Zissu's rights under federal securities
law were preserved. By bringing the claim alleging oral and written misstatements, he
admitted that the representations and warranties were made to him outside the private
offering memorandum. It was this breach of his own acknowledgement that no repre-
sentations or warranties had been made to him outside the memorandum which gave
rise to the defendants' counterclaim. See id.
170 See id.
171 Id. at 78. The court found that the "any and all damages" clause in the sub-
scription agreement was used to maintain the private offering exemption and was in-
sufficiently specific to put Zissu on notice of his potential responsibility for the defend-
ants' legal costs. See id. at 79. As the Second Circuit left open the possibility that, with
a sufficiently specific clause, the securities fraud plaintiff may be assessed the defend-
ants' legal fees for breach of warranty, see id. at 79-80, this Comment sets forth a
framework for determining when a counterclaim based on a contract would not deter
meritorious suits and, therefore, should be granted.
172 1933 Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
173 1934 Act § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982).
174 1933 Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982); 1934 Act § 29(a), 15 U.S.C.
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section 14 to provide the purchasers of securities with the procedural
benefits of the 1933 Act in Wilko v. Swan.'75 The Court did not pre-
clude the possibility that "a buyer and seller of securities, under some
circumstances, may deal at arm's length on equal terms . . . . 17' Fur-
thermore, in Shearson lAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon,177 the
Court held that section "29(a) only prohibits waiver of the substantive
obligations imposed by the Exchange Act."'T' An indemnity clause
merely holds the buyer to her warranties; it does not waive any sub-
stantive rights.
If an issuer has complied with the terms of Regulation D, particu-
larly its "accredited investor" or "sophisticated purchaser" require-
ments, then the buyer and seller are in parity. Under these circum-
stances, the investor does not need the full protections available under
the registration provisions. Exempting the issuer from registration re-
quirements, therefore, is consistent with the views expressed by the
SEC,'179 Congress,'80 and the Court.' s ' Because the law finds that the
buyer and seller are on "equal footing" when the requirements of Reg-
ulation D are satisfied, indemnification contracts from the investor to
the issuer would not constitute contracts of adhesion.
The purpose of the contractual indemnification provision is to hold
a wealthy and sophisticated investor to her warranties and to ensure
that she has read and understands the precise disclosures with which
the law requires she be provided. To hold that such a provision is "con-
trary to the Act" makes disclosure the futile and expensive exercise
many fear.' 82 After all, who is better situated to understand the man-
§ 78cc(a) (1982).
175 346 U.S. 427, 435-36 (1953). Wilko is most widely known for its implications
concerning the arbitrability of federal and state securities law claims under the United
States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). See Cantor, Another Hurdle Remains
for Civil RICO Plaintiffs: Will a Predispute Arbitration Agreement Bar RICO Plain-
tiffs from a Federal Forum?, 6 J.L. & COM. 283, 292-93 (1986); Schaller & Schaller,
Applying the Wilko Doctrine's Anti-Arbitration Policy in Commodities Fraud Cases,
61 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 515, 527-30 (1985); Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 549-60. Wilko's
specific holding concerning the arbitrability of securities law claims has been all but
overruled by Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
178 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
177 107 S.Ct. 2332 (1987).
178 Id. at 2338.
179 See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
180 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess 3 (1933).
181 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
182 See generally HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
95TH CONG., I1ST SFss., REPORT OF ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
TO THE SECURITIFS & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1977) (includes a de-
tailed description of the disclosure system and proposals for change as well as dissenting
statement by Committee member Kripke, who felt more attention should have been
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dated disclosure than the knowledgeable and experienced investor?'
Second, while section 29(b) of the 1934 Act specifically invalidates-
any contract made in violation of federal securities laws, it does not bar
enforcement of a contractual arrangement by an innocent party in the
private offering context. 84 This interpretation is consistent with the
Second Circuit's decision in Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co.,"8 5 in
which an issuer sought to enforce an underwriting agreement. In void-
ing the contract, the Second Circuit specifically relied on the fact that
the prospectus contained materially misleading information that was
part of the contract. 86 "[I]t is clear that a contract which violates the
laws of the United States and contravenes the public policy as ex-
pressed in those laws is unenforceable.'
l8 7
This view also is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of section 29(b) in Mills:
[The] language [of section 29(b)] establishes that the guilty
party is precluded from enforcing the contract against an un-
willing innocent party, but it does not compel the conclusion
that the contract is a nullity, creating no enforceable rights
given to the incremental value of a specific disclosure requirement); H. KRIPKE, THE
SEC AND CORPORATE DISC.OSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE xvii
(1979) (taking the position that as securities regulation is becoming "more and more
detailed and pervasive, its effectiveness is rapidly diminishing"); Benston, Required
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132, 141-49 (1973) (mathematical analysis of the impact of
required disclosure on market returns, concluding that disclosure requirements have no
measurable positive effect on returns).
183 Alarmingly, one court appears to have permitted a sophisticated investor to
expressly repudiate his representations in the subscription agreement that he read the
required disclosure. This court found that the investor's attorney and personal advisor
"should have known that [the investor] would not read the placement materials ... .
DuPont v. Brady, 646 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court based its find-
ing on the length of the relationship between the investor and his advisors and their
knowledge of the manner in which the investor approached his investments. Id.
'84 The Supreme Court first interpreted § 29(b) in A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur
d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38 (1941). Frost involved the sale of unregistered stock
from an issuer to an underwriter based on an exclusive contract. See id. at 39. When
the underwriter sued for performance of the contract, the issuer claimed the contract
was void because it constituted an unregistered public offering in violation of the securi-
ties laws. See id. In what Professor Loss described as a hard case that possibly made
"bad law," see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1048, the Court declined to
enforce the contract given the other remedies available to the underwriter under the
securities laws: "[Tihe clear legislative purpose [of § 29(b) is the] protection of inno-
cent purchasers of securities. They are given definite remedies inconsistent with the
idea that every contract having relation to sales of unregistered share is absolutely void
. " 312 U.S. at 43.
185 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1952).
188 See id. at 843-44.
187 Id. at 843 (footnote omitted).
19881
1000 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
even in a party innocent of the violation. The lower federal
courts have read § 29(b) . . . as rendering the contract
merely voidable at the option of the innocent party. This in-
terpretation is eminently sensible.188
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Zissu defendants, who
were the innocent parties, should not be precluded by federal securities
law from enforcing the indemnity contract and, thus, should not be re-
quired to meet a "bad faith-frivolous claim" standard to shift defense
costs to the plaintiff.
One argument against allowing such counterclaims is the potential
"chilling" effect these claims might have on plaintiffs seeking to enforce
their rights.' 89 Closer examination of the circumstances that constitute
a breach of an investor's warranties, however, suggests that the burden
of such actions will fall upon investors who breach their express war-
ranties for reasons contrary to the basis for the statutory right on which
the investors are suing. After all, the breach is not the filing of the
lawsuit, but the express repudiation of the warranties by the investor
during the litigation. The Zissu clause expressly preserves the investor's
right to file the suit. The counterclaim is established when the investor
repudiates her warranties. Due to her qualification as an accredited or
sophisticated investor, she is deemed to understand her warranties and
accept the ramifications stemming therefrom when she purchases the
investment.
The private offering plaintiff who legitimately did not know of the
indemnification or its effect is not precluded from proving the defend-
ant's liability under sections 12(2) or 10(b) for failing to adequately
inform the investor. Because section 12(2) liability also attaches to both
oral and written statements, the defendant could not orally repudiate
the clause at the time of sale in an effort to induce the investor into the
offering and later assert the counterclaim without violating that section.
Furthermore, in an action under section 12(2), the plaintiff already
bears the burden of proving her lack of knowledge,' 90 and the plaintiff
need not show reliance on the false or misleading statement or omission
in making the investment. 9' Thus, the mere existence of the indemnifi-
188 396 U.S. at 387-88 (citing Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783,
,792 (8th Cir. 1967)) (footnote omitted); see also Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith,
312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Bellanca Corp.,
288 F.2d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1961); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maher v. J. R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133, 138-139
(S.D.N.Y 1967).
189 See Zissu, 627 F. Supp. at 692-93.
190 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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cation clause does not impede the investor's fraud action. In terms of
who could make the counterclaim and still avoid liability, section 12(2)
liability extends to a broad class of sellers. Any defendant, therefore,
asserting the breach counterclaim would almost certainly be included
should the investor establish a violation.192 In sum, the private offering
plaintiff bears no additional burden in establishing a section 12(2) ac-
tion when she is held to her express warranties than she does without
the indemnification clause.
Finally, if the issuer has failed to comply with securities laws,
then, under the above interpretations of sections 14 and 29, it is no
longer an innocent party and therefore is barred from establishing its
counterclaim.
Limiting the enforceability of such agreements to private offerings
that qualify for the exemption from registration under Regulation D
reduces a risk to issuers that the SEC implicitly acknowledges exists.
The terms of Regulation D reflect the fact that a private offering plain-
tiff may misrepresent, at times, her eligibility as an accredited investor
or sophisticated purchaser status. Indeed, "[t]he definition of 'accredited
investor' includes any person who comes within or 'who the issuer rea-
sonably believes' comes within one of the enumerated categories
. ... . While the SEC remains reluctant to define what constitutes
a reasonable belief,194 offeree sophistication continues to play a role in
maintaining the Rule 506 exemption.1 95 The imposition of section
12(1) liability for violations of section 5 in such circumstances is a
needless risk, unduly hindering the capital formation purposes of the
private offering exemption.
The effect of enforcement of indemnifications in the private offer-
ing context, in terms of the intended legislative policy of section 11(e)196
and the judicial belief that that section was meant to deter suits brought
for settlement value, 9 " is merely to deter those actions which inflict
unwarranted litigation expense on the issuer. This is consonant with
'Congress' intent in enacting section 11(e) in 1934.
The public policy implications of the potential chilling effect of
192 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
193 Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 33-6455, 48
Fed. Reg. 10,045 (March 10, 1983).
194 See id. at 10,045-46 (stating that what constitutes "reasonable" belief will de-
pend on the facts of each particular case).
19' Cf Anastasi v. American Petroleum, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 273 (D. Colo. 1984)
(issuer who relies on misrepresentations of investors regarding their financial suitability
has no cause of action for damages sustained by loss of exemption against investors).
19 See supra notes 122-27, 136 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
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private offering indemnification provisions were considered by Judge
Edward Weinfeld in Zissu:
Indeed, public policy considerations require that Zissu
be held to his express obligations in order to encourage re-
spect for the law and to impress upon him and others that
specifically defined commitments and representations are not
scraps of paper to be disregarded at will. If the enforcement
of this indemnification clause on these facts deters future
Frederick Zissus from repudiating expressly stated represen-
tations and testifying . . . contrary to the facts warranted, it
is fatuous to argue that it is contrary to public policy.198
CONCLUSION
Sellers of private offerings claiming an exemption from the regis-
tration provisions of federal securities law should be entitled to enforce
indemnification clauses included in the subscription documents in the
proper circumstances. To be eligible to do so, the seller must have com-
plied fully with federal securities laws, including disclosing the exis-
tence and effect of the indemnification clause. In order for the seller's
counterclaim to succeed, the investor must have failed to demonstrate a
securities law violation and also have repudiated her express warran-
ties. The investor must be sophisticated or misrepresent her suitability
for a private offering.
In light of the combined legislative, judicial, and administrative
judgments that Regulation D expresses, issuers and purchasers should
be viewed as operating on equal footing with regard to disclosure when
the offering complies with federal securities laws. For the issuer, this
means that the offering has complied with the exemption requirements
and that no false or misleading statements or omissions exist. For the
purchaser, this means she has received all the protections to which she
is entitled under the "sliding scale" provisions of securities laws.
Indemnification contracts in these circumstances should not be
considered void as contrary to public policy. In fact, they further the
underlying policies of disclosure and capital formation. The indemnity
agreement provides an incentive for the sophisticated offeree to read the
disclosure mandated by law which she can reasonably be expected to
understand. The capital formation policies of the private offering ex-
emption are furthered by reducing the risks of section 12(1) liability
and deterring meritless suits against the issuer.
198 Zissu, 627 F. Supp. at 694.
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The deterrent effect of these contracts will manifest itself in those
who would conduct a "modern" strike suit as a fishing expedition or
who seek to delay or bar the collection of otherwise valid debt obliga-
tions. Private offering plaintiffs who legitimately claim they were not
informed of the effect or existence of the indemnity contract will bear
no greater burdens in establishing a securities law violation than they





The editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review take
great pleasure in dedicating this issue to Professor Ralph S. Spritzer,
who is currently teaching law at Arizona State University. As the fol-
lowing selections make clear, Professor Spritzer's dedication to teach-
ing, his students, and the legal profession will be missed by the entire
Law School community. The Law Review wishes him well in his fu-
ture endeavors.
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